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REASONS TO ESCHEW FEDERAL LAWMAKING AND 
EMBRACE COMMON LAW APPROACHES TO GENETIC 
DISCRIMINATION 
CANDICE HOKE1 
 
Good afternoon.  It’s a privilege to be here, particularly since I am an 
employment law teacher with scant understanding of the gravity of genetic 
discrimination prior to preparing for this conference.  
The main charge to me is to show you alternatives other than, for instance, 
federal legislation that could be deployed to rectify genetic discrimination.  
You may have noticed that in our conference materials, and in a number of the 
presentations, there has been either an explicit or an implicit call along the lines of 
“there ought to be a law that …”  Professor Hoffman and I agree:  there ought to be 
some laws, but I want to talk to you a little bit about two possible, two real goals 
here.  
One is to ask you to critically evaluate whether a federal statute is the right 
remedial response at this point in time, and secondly, to ask you to start thinking 
about the possibility of drafting into service what we in law refer to as traditional 
state common-law approaches that actually might give us more and better ways to 
remedy what’s going on than simply turning to Congress.  
I.  FEDERAL LEGISLATION–TIMING AND IMPACT 
Now, as background for talking to you, I’d like for you to reflect, not about the 
idealized Congress of the United States, but who is in Congress; right now who are 
the individuals that actually fill the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. 
A VOICE:  Not a pretty picture. 
PROFESSOR HOKE:  Indeed.  That’s the backdrop for what we’re going to 
discuss now.   
As others have mentioned to you, we have a wide range of law-making entities at 
the federal and state levels.  
Federal law in this country has obvious power and influence.  Federal law has the 
capacity to create mandatory duties and prohibitions, and its scope, unless limited, 
can be nationwide.  The broad influence that it exerts is frequently not recognized.  
Even where federal law is not controlling, state courts and state policy entities will 
often look to the federal law for guidance as to what is truly right and good, and 
incorporate federal standards into state law.  
But, given the actual identity and commitments of those who are currently in 
control of federal policy making, specifically those in control of Congress, is this a 
proper time to press for federal legislation?  Especially since whatever balance the 
federal policy strikes will exert great influence over related state law, we must raise 
this question.   
                                                                
1Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.  J.D., Yale Law School.  
Professor Hoke has taught Employment law for fourteen years.  Her primary research focuses 
on preemption and other issues concerning federal-state legal relations. 
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Federal law possesses an additional power that Professor Hoffman has 
mentioned, and that is the problem of pre-emption.  Federal pre-emption of state law 
can occur via explicit language within a statute–for instance, the ERISA statutes.  A 
provision may expressly mandate there shall be no state power to issue law in a 
particular arena.  But power also rests within the courts to hold that certain federal 
law impliedly preempts state law and state policy from a subject  area.  
So when federal statutes are enacted, one potentiality is that they will be viewed 
to be setting the entirety of policies for the nation, and not simply the federal rule for 
the subject matter that the feds are controlling at that point.  In other words, 
enactment of federal legislation may mean that the feds have the first, last, and 
complete words on the given subject until statutory amendment occurs. 
Your response might be:  so what?  This sounds great.  If I’m going to work on 
creating any kind of legislation, I’d rather have it have the broadest possible impact 
and there’s really no reason to talk about anything else.  
Let me inventory various considerations that should be evaluated before choosing 
to press for federal legislation, in addition to the identity and values of the current 
Congress.  First, a federal statute on an issue does tend to rigidify a policy for a large 
number of years.  Let’s say we pass a statute this year.  It is very unlikely that the 
issue will resurface on the legislative agenda in Washington for another decade.  
That means we better have our ducks lined up well to achieve exactly what we want 
because we probably will not have another opportunity for a good while.  It’s rare for 
legislation to be permitted onto the congressional agenda simply for the purpose of  
correcting errors or omissions, or to rectify compromises, when an omnibus bill on 
the subject has been recently enacted.  So, we must recall the difficulty in getting the 
subject matter back onto the legislative agenda.  
Second, as previously mentioned, the legislation may be deemed to be pre-
emptive and thus, eliminate the novel State initiatives that have other speakers have 
discussed.  If some of the other States’ efforts are more progressive on the subject 
than what can be obtained via federal legislation, and might be used as models for 
other States and for later federal legislation, the elimination of these other models 
because of a judicial ruling of federal pre-emption would seem an unwise strategy.   
The third concern, and I would say critical point, which was mentioned yesterday 
in Paul’s [Miller] talk and several times today, is that the authoritative interpretive 
power over federal legislation lies in our federal courts.  We currently have a 
problem with federal court decisions taking positions rather hostile to employee 
interests.  So, again, I would suggest that this is yet another cause to consider   
alternatives to the rather reflexive embrace of seeking federal lawmaking.   
Thus, I am suggesting that when you start thinking “there ought to be a law,” an 
additional series of questions must be raised about what kind of law, rather than 
moving quickly from the position in favor of new law to the conclusion that it has to 
be federal law.  
You can ask, for instance, from which level of government, state or federal, 
should the law issue?  Second, by which mechanism do you want the new policy to 
emanate?  It need not be statutory, coming from the legislature.  It may be that it 
would be better to emerge from the court systems.  This morning Harry Zanville 
reminded us about the federal common-law power.  Again, under this group of 
federal judges, I’m a little leery of advocating federal judicial policymaking.  I doubt 
the federal courts will strike a fair balance between employees and employers right 
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now.  But when we talk about state common law, at least in Ohio, for instance, we 
have many promising opportunities.  
But I still haven’t convinced you not to look seriously at federal legislative 
possibilities, I encourage you to ask at least these questions.  First, assess whether the 
policy debate around the set of issues, for instance, genetic discrimination, has 
matured to such a point that you believe we are ready for a piece of national 
legislation that has the potential to congeal the policy in this country for a good many 
years.  Or, are we rather in an infant stage where we still have some thinking to do?  
We need to think through the implications of various regulatory options before we 
can fashion what we think would be a wise and sound policy.  
Second, consider how much experience has been gained through state initiatives 
or even other non-national federal initiatives, such as the Executive Order, that can 
be evaluated critically in deciding what kind of omnibus law is needed.  For instance, 
as a part of this process, assessments should be made of the efforts several states 
have already undertaken.  Professor Hoffman said that there had been 31 initiatives 
in the States already.  Has there been sufficient time to evaluate those efforts?  Have 
we obtained careful, critical, comparative analyses of these various statutes and other 
kinds of state policy initiatives as to their relatives merits and demerits before we 
start moving forward on a federal level?  For instance, the Massachusetts statute, 
which is heralded as the best one currently is critiqued by George Annas as deficient 
in some major ways.  Undertaking these kinds of experiments would be very 
beneficial before trying to fashion omnibus federal legislation.  
Third, evaluate your political power realistically.  Does your set of interests have 
sufficient national legislative influence so that the national legislative result will 
actually be beneficial rather than a series of compromises that might set back your 
whole agenda?  
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, consider whether there is a presidential 
administration which will favorably interpret your legislation and likely issue helpful 
interpretive regulations and engage in useful enforcement.  In its absence, it may be 
unwise to move forward with federal legislation at this time.  
If, as I believe, you have concluded that it is not yet time for federal legislation, 
perhaps you are willing to consider options at the State level.  It’s worth mentioning 
that even when we do focus on state legislation, it is usually easier;  often, fewer and 
lower barriers are interposed to State legislative enactments.  One of the 
constitutional roles of State governments is that of policy experimentation.  In many 
of the constitutional decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court, the strengthening of 
federalism—the allocation of power between a national and subnational 
governments—has been  justified in part so that different policy arrangements will 
emerge and critical evaluation can occur before we try to fashion a more consistent 
federal policy.  
Focusing on the State level also allows proponents to educate a portion of the 
population about a particular policy area and garner their support for legislative 
efforts before trying to go national.  So, for instance, the people in Ohio (where the 
State lacks a statute) could be educated about the problem of genetic discrimination 
by insurers and employers.  A statutory effort could be enacted. Then, if later it 
seems prudent to move forward on a national level, the educational efforts in each 
State will mean that a significant portion of the public will have been exposed to the 
problems justifying national legislation and will encourage their federal legislators in 
that effort.   
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II.  STATE COMMON LAW REMEDIES 
Short of passing state legislation, of enacting a state statute, are there other 
remedies or legal protections for genetic discrimination available to employees at the 
State level?  The possibilities are present if traditional remedies residing within the 
power of the state courts are re-fashioned.  
A.  Background for NonLawyers 
You may be aware that the American court system derives its structure and 
traditional powers from the courts of merry ’ole England, centuries before the new 
world received English settlements.  Embedded in our state courts are what are 
termed “traditional common-law powers.”  What that term means is open to some 
interpretive controversy, but one of the benefits of moving in the common-law 
direction is that at its core, courts have the power to fashion policy, rights, duties, 
and remedies for violation of those rights and duties without any enactments from 
the state legislature.  
In fact, this is exactly the way we obtained most of our property rights, our 
contract rights and our duties to avoid personal injuries known as torts – via the 
courts, not through legislatures.  These rights were fashioned by courts incrementally 
over the centuries.  Many times today, however, people tend to think in terms of 
having to go to a legislature for the creation of new rights.  This is simply false.  One 
can turn to the courts generally only through litigation but the litigation invokes the 
courts’ inherent and historical powers.  Basically the procedural structure of 
invoking common-law powers is to identify existing rights that are just a step away, 
so to speak, from the rights that the proponent is attempting to have recognized at 
this point in time, and then the proponent argues to the court that we are so close that 
this is just a tiny step and the new right is within the broad tradition of this group of 
rights.  For centuries, we have engaged in common law policymaking through our 
courts.  
Some contemporary legislators, however, have expressed concerns about these 
traditional common law judicial powers.  They offer comments such as:  “Only the 
legislature has the power to create policy or to write the law.”  Traditionally, the 
legislatures were not engaged in very much statute-making at all because of 
transportation problems, communication problems, et cetera.  The courts were the 
locus of law making.  That’s the way it was historically and, although the ease with 
which the legislators can now travel and gather has changed dramatically, these 
traditional judicial powers have not been withdrawn.  The common law powers are 
latent powers waiting to be invoked.  
B.  Ohio Tort of Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy 
While somewhat tardy when compared with many other States nationally, Ohio 
has embraced the tort of wrongful discharge for violation of public policy.  Indeed, 
more recently, Ohio courts have been among the most innovative in fashioning a 
balance between employer and employee rights rather than continuing to repose 
virtually all of workplace power in the employer.  The judges involved in this effort 
activity include Ohio Supreme Court Justices of both major political parties.   
This new tort was designed to create grave disincentives for any employer that 
might attempt to elicit worker assistance in activities  that would undermine 
important public policy.  The tort’s origins date to a 1959 California case where the 
discharged employee had been subpoenaed to appear at a state legislative hearing to 
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testify concerning the employer’s business activities.2  The employee claimed the 
employer had requested that he testify untruthfully but that he had testified truthfully.  
Displeased with the employee’s testimony, the employer fired the worker from his 
job.   
In evaluating whether any new legal protections should be accorded to workers, 
the court noted that although the criminal law offered penalties for suborning 
perjury, the civil law had been largely silent.  Yet the court opined that the civil law 
should also seek to vindicate the important public interest at stake by creating a 
damages remedy for employees who were discharged when they refused to cooperate 
in an employer-led violation of important public policy.  The court reasoned that 
exposure to litigation and significant money damages would provide powerful 
disincentives to employers who might otherwise condition continued employment 
upon the workers’ violation of law. 
The range of employer conduct that falls within the rubric of “violating public 
policy” is dynamic and not easily defined.  The Ohio Supreme Court has recently 
announced a four-part test to determine when employer conduct will give rise to the 
tort, in Ohio referred to as a Greeley claim.3  First, the discharged worker must 
identify a clear public policy arising from the State or federal Constitution, a statute 
or administrative regulation, or the common law.  For instance, in the context of 
someone who is discharged because of genetic discrimination, the law that might be 
identified as constituting clear public policy might be drawn from the federal 
Rehabilitation Act,4 equivalent State legislation, from the federal Americans With 
Disabilities Act,5 or if it is a genetic trait that is racially or ethnically linked, from 
antidiscrimination statutes.6  Although slightly more of a stretch, the policies 
embedded in HIPAA might also be used to establish a clear public policy forbidding 
the use of genetic information in a manner that harms a workers’ access to 
employment.7  Notably, the State court can draw out a policy or value that is shorn of 
prescribed statutory procedures or other impediments and enforce it via the common 
law.8  
                                                                
2See Petermann v. Intern’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App. 1959). 
3See Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E. 2d 308 (Ohio 1997).  Greeley v. Miami 
Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 55 N.E.2d 1981 (1990) first 
announced the judicial acceptance of the tort but Kulch articulated the governing four-part 
legal test. 
4Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 705-794a. 
5Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213. 
6Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000s-17. 
7Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.  HIPAA forbids group 
health plans from establishing rules for enrollment eligibility based on “genetic information.”  
An insurer cannot refuse to insure an employer’s group that seeks health insurance because 
particular members of the group have genetic predispositions toward certain illnesses.   
8See, e.g., Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E. 2d 308 (Ohio 1997); Helmick v. 
Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc., 45 Ohio St.3d 131, 543 N.E.2d 1212 (1989).   
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Second, the discharged worker must show that for an employer to dismiss 
employees under circumstances like those involved in the plaintiff’s dismissal would 
jeopardize the public policy that was identified in step one.  For instance, where an 
employee is discharged  simply because of test results showing she carries a marker 
for a racially linked disease, the argument would elaborate that the clear public 
policies protecting workers from losing their jobs because of racial discrimination 
will be undermined if the employer is not held accountable in tort.  
Third, the worker is required to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s dismissal was 
motivated by conduct related to the public policies identified in steps one and two — 
a causation requirement.  So long as the record lacks additional justifications for the 
discharge, step three may be relatively easily to satisfy.   
Fourth and finally, the worker must show that employer lacked an overriding 
legitimate business justification for the dismissal.  Whether the fact that the worker 
would have caused a significant increase in the premiums for employer-provided 
health insurance constitutes a legitimate and sufficient overriding business reason for 
the dismissal would have to be determined in judicial decisions.  
How easy is it to bring and win such a case?  In Ohio we have been very 
fortunate over the past decade during which Greeley claims have been authorized.  
One of the best examples of the creative way this approach can be used is to describe 
a landmark whistleblower case–Kulch v. Industrial Fibers, Inc.  
Whistleblowers were so named because they are said to have “blown the whistle” 
(similar to a referee) on illegal activities within the employer or company.  The 
brutal fact of the whistleblower cases nationwide is that employers have a great 
propensity to fire the worker-whistleblowers and sometimes to do so after an array of 
abusive treatment toward them in the workplace.  Ohio’s legislature responded to the 
problem of discharged whistleblowers by enacting a prolix, cumbersome statute with 
all sorts of pre-requisites that had to be met by the employee who was blowing the 
whistle if the employee were to be protected from job loss or other employer 
retaliation.  For instance, except when reporting criminal activity, the statute requires 
an employee to notify the employer orally about the concern, provide appropriate 
time for the employer to remedy the situation, then file a written complaint internally 
with the employer, and then and only then, the employee may file a report with a law 
enforcement agency.  If any of the preliminary steps are missed, the Ohio 
whistleblower statute will not protect the employee from retaliation, including 
discharge.   
It does not require great insight into humanity to suggest that most workers do 
not know and will not ever completely understand the progression of steps that must 
be followed in order to protect themselves and their jobs from retaliation.  If a 
concerned worker does make a report to a government agency and is thereafter fired, 
at that point the employee may visit an attorney and receive the tardy observation 
that because the worker failed to walk through X, Y and Z steps, the law provides no 
assistance.   
In the Kulch case, one enterprising attorney noticed that the Ohio courts had 
already declared that the new common law tort remedy could be the vehicle for 
enforcing statutory rights even if the procedural prerequisites for the statutory 
remedy had not been met.  The attorney argued that the Ohio whistleblower statute 
should be handled in this manner as well.  The workers’ attorney  contended that 
embedded in our state public policy could be found the concern that employees 
should be able to bring forward to public officials information about wrongful, 
2001-02]   COMMON LAW APPROACHES TO GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 59 
illegal conduct of the employer that harmed the public interest, and that workers 
should not be penalized for that responsible citizenship with the loss of the job.  The 
defendant employer responded by noting that the public policy of Ohio was to 
protect workers from retaliation if and only if the procedural prerequisites of notice 
to the employer had been met.   
The Ohio Supreme Court generally agreed with the employees’ point of view and 
declared that the state’s policy is to protect whistle blowers.  The Court said that it 
fell within its common law powers to recognize the employer’s conduct as fitting 
within the established tort of wrongful discharge for violation of public policy.  
Moreover, the tort did not require the satisfaction of the procedural prerequisites 
enunciated within the statute. 
In sum, many legislative compromises emerge in workplace law because 
employers are pushing their interests and employees are (normally less effectively) 
trying to push their interests, and the outcome is a statutory mess.  The Ohio 
Supreme Court can be viewed as extracting the core substantive policy and enforcing 
it through the common law, shearing the substantive policy from the impediments. 
Whether the State Supreme Court should be engaged in this activity is 
contestable but the fact is, it is occurring and does have a long legal tradition external 
to the State of Ohio.  And the Court has handled a state discrimination statute in a 
similar manner, by allowing an antidiscrimination policy to be enforceable against an 
employer which did not employ the minimum number of employees for the statute to 
be operative.9   The Court reasoned in part that sexual harassment was a violation of 
the public policy of Ohio no matter how small the employer, and allowed the worker 
to pursue the lawsuit as a common law tort of wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy even though the state statutory requirements had not been satisfied.   
Thus, the flexibility of state common law warrants its exploration by proponents 
of substantive protections from genetic discrimination in employment.  Both State 
common law and statutory options should be plumbed for possibilities before turning 
to the risky effort to enact a federal statute that might undermine progressive 
innovations in the States. 
                                                                
9Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc., 45 Ohio St.3d 131, 543 N.E.2d 1212 
(1989). 
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